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STUDENT NOTES
AcTIoNs - ELECTION OF REMEDIES. - Because the interests
of a second wife had intervened, the first wife failed in her equity
suit to set aside a fraudulently obtained decree annulling her
marriage. .She then sued her former husband for damages. The
first ground of demurrer set up was that by electing to sue in
equity for a restoration of the marriage relation the plaintiff was
estopped to bring an action for damages. The court said ". . . . a
party is not estopped to maintain a second suit unless the two
suits have substantially the same aim and scope and the remedy
sought is substantially the same in each." Cameron v. Cameron.2
The defendant was evidently relying on the doctrine of elec-
tion of remedies. The court, however, simply cited RuLrnG CASE
LAw2 and laid down a rule which is really the test for res judicata
and has practically nothing to do with election of remedies. This
does not mean, of course, that the ultimate result was wrong. The
'-162 S. E. 173 (W. Va. 1932). For a complete statement of the facts in
this case, see case comment, infra p. 371.
29 R. C. L. 964.
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former suit had not purported to adjudicate the question of dam-
ages, and, as an attempt will now be made to show, the situation
was not one for the application of the so-called doctrine of election
of remedies.
Courts have employed election of remedies as a sort of gen-
eral catch-all, which can be used at almost any time or place, to
such an extent that it has lost all semblance of any specific mean-
ing, if any it ever had. Everything from the starting of a suit to
satisfaction of judgment has been held to constitute an election of
remedies. Chancellor Kent said any decisive act was enough.'
Judicial opinions are now filled with dicta and holdings as to what
is and what is not a decisive act. It is pretty well established that
the doctrine does not apply to consistent remedies.' Any number
of those may usually be pursued even to judgment so long as no
one of them is satisfied or some other rule of law does not inter-
fere. But a different attitude has been evinced toward incon-
sistent remedies. Some courts have said that an injured party
selects his remedy at his peril and is thereafter forever barred from
asserting an inconsistent course even though the one first adopted
proved useless.' By the better view, however, an attempt to fol-
low a remedy which does not exist will not, ordinarily, bind one.'
Few cases in West Virginia have dealt with election of rem-
edies. In Bright v. Molloan7 it is said that the prosecution of
one remedial right to judgment, whether the judgment was for or
against the party so prosecuting, was a decisive act which con-
stituted an election, barring the subsequent prosecution of any
inconsistent remedial right. The statement, however, was only
3 Sanger v. Wood, 3 Johns. Ch. 416 (N. Y. 1818) "Any decisive act of the
party, with knowledge of his rights and of the facts, determines his election
in the ease of conflicting and inconsistent remedies."
IWilliams v. Brown, 70 W. Va. 472, 74 S. E. 409 (1912) ; Post v. Bailey &
Co., 68 W. Va. 434, 69 S. E. 910 (1910); Sturdivant v. Reese, 86 Ark. 452,
111 S. W. 261 (1908); Jackson v. State Industrial Bd., 280 Ill. 526, 117 N.
E. 705 (1917); Walden National Bank v. Birch, 130 N. Y. 221, 29 N. E. 127
(1891); Connihan v. Thompson, 111 Mass. 270 (1873).
5 United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U. S. 290, 43 S. Ct. 100 (1922);
Glezos v. Glezos, 346 Ill. 96, 178 N. E. 379 (1931); Baltimore American Ins.
Co. v. Zimmerman, 127 Kan. 145, 274 Pac. 255 (1929); Blumb Bldg. Co. v.
Ingersoll, 99 N. J. Eq. 563, 134 Atl. 176 (1926); Whalen v. Stewart, 194 N.
Y. 495, 87 N. E. 819 (1909).
0 Bierce v. Hutchins, 205 U. S. 340, 27 S. Ct. 524 (1906) ; Thomas v. Sugar-
man, 218 U. S. 129, 30 S. Ct. 650 (1909); Corbett v. Boston etc. R. R. Co.,
219 Mass. 351, 107 N. E. 60 (1914) ; Hofman v. Hofman, 108 N. J. Eq. 161,
154 At. 518 (1931); Becker v. Kelsey, 157 Atl. 177 (N. J. 1931); Clark v.
Kirby, 243 N. Y. 295, 153 N. E. 79 (1926) ; Strong v. Strong, 102 N. Y. 69,
5 N. E. 799 (1886); Whipple v. Stevens, 25 R. I. 563, 57 Atl. 375 (1904).
775 W. Va. 116, 83 S. E. 298 (1914).
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a dictum, for the former suit in that instance had actually ad-
judicated the matter on its merits; so it was res judicata in the
second suit. There is a dictum in Stone v. Kaufma?e to the effect
that an election between inconsistent remedies will bind one. In
Dudley v. Barrett' the court had the right approach when it said,
"Before an election of remedy can be ordered, it must appear
that the party has more than one remedy." Language to the same
effect is found in Adams v. Power Co." While West Virginia
seems to have no square holding on the point, authority is abun-
dant in other jurisdictions to the effect that an attempt to pursue
a futile remedy will not bar one from subsequently adopting an
inconsistent right. The highest court of Oregon apparently had
the proper conception of the situation when it said, "An election
can exist only where there is a choice between two or more incon-
sistent remedies actually existing at the time the election is made.
If a party attempts to make use of only a fancied remedy, then
the barren attempt does not preclude him from afterward pur-
suing a remedy to which he is actually entitled.'
It would seem, therefore, that, ordinarily, there cannot be an
election of remedies until an action has been prosecuted to final
judgment. Before that time, there is no certain means of knowing
whether the plaintiff is pursuing an actual or a fancied remedy.
A judgment against him proves either that his remedy was in-
adequate or that it was improperly handled. In either event,
there does not appear to be any very substantial reason for saying
that the plaintiff is precluded from other remedies unless his acts
have created an equitable estoppel or have necessarily terminated
such other courses as might once have been available. If, in re-
liance upon the plaintiff's representations in the first suit, the
defendant has, in good faith, so altered his position that he would
88 W. Va. 588, 590, 107 S. E. 295, 296 (1921).
66 W. Va. 363, 66 S. E. 507 (1909).
10 102 W. Va. 66, 135 S. E. 662 (1926). This case really deals with election
between parties. It holds that accepting current benefits from the state com-
pensation commission does not bar the injured workman from a later suit
against his employer.
n Medford Nat. Bank v. Blanchard, 299 Pac. 301 (Ore. 1931). For language
to the same effect, see Schotis v. North Coast Stevedoring Co., 1 Pac. (2d)
221 (Wash. 1931). See also the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis
in United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., supra n. 5, in which he says, "If he
deems it doubtful which one of several possible courses will lead to relief, he
may (even where the courses are inconsistent) follow one to defeat, and still
pursue thereafter another remedy until he ultimately finds one which will
afford redress, provided always that the facts do not create an equitable
estoppel. ''
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be greatly prejudiced by the plaintiff's assuming a new and dif-
ferent role, the plaintiff should be estopped from asserting a rem-
edy inconsistent with the one first employed.
Sometimes following one remedy necessarily terminates
others. It is not much disputed that when one elects to affirm a
voidable contract and sue for damages because of some fraud con-
nected with it, he cannot thereafter sue for rescission, for when
once the contract is affirmed, the right to rescind is lost."2  A
similar situation arises when there has been an unauthorized sale
of property. An action for the proceeds of such unauthorized
sale affirms the sale and prevents the plaintiff from later maintain-
ing an action for the tort." But the converse of these propositions
is not always true." It one fails in his attempt to rescind, he has
not necessarily done anything to bar an action for damages.' The
distinction is that affirming a voidable transaction is a one-party
act, but one party may not be able by his own act alone to rescind
or terminate a contract. Courts have, however, frequently failed
to note this distinction.'6
In situations where the doctrine of election of remedies is
usually applied, the results obtained seem to be justified in only
three cases: (1) where bringing the former suit resulted in an
equitable estoppel; (2) where bringing the former suit affirmed
an otherwise voidable transaction; and (3) where there has been
a judgment favorable to the plaintiff in the former suit. In the
first instance, the estoppel will work a proper result without any
assistance from the doctrine of election of remedies. In the sec-
ond situation, election of remedies really has no application, for
the second remedy no longer exists, it having been lost when the
voidable transaction was affirmed."' In the third situation, the
"Weeke v. Reeve, 65 Fla. 374, 61 So. 749 (1913); Thompson v. Howard,
31 Mich. 309 (1875).
3 Keene Five-Cents Savings Bank v. Archer, 109 Iowa 419, 80 N. W. 505
(1899); Butler v. Hildredth, 5 Mete. 49 (Mass. 1842); Welsh v. Carder, 95
Mo. App. 41, 68 S. IV. 580 (1902); Demars v. Hudon, 33 Mont. 170, 82 Pac.
952 (1905).
1" Tanner v. Johnson, 119 Ark. 506, 178 S. W. 376 (1915) ; Tracy v. Aldrich,
236 S. W. 347 (Mo. 1921).
1 Gunderson v. Halvorson, 140 Mlin. 292, 168 N. W. 8 (1918); Strong v.
Strong, supra n. 6.
"1 Cases cited supra n. 5.
27It seems that as to affirmance of voidable transactions, the court might
very well say that the affirmance is for the purpose of that particular suit
only and is not binding for any other purpose, but no court seems to have
taken this view. Courts apparently make no distinction between affirming
express contracts and contracts implied from a wrongful dealing with the
plaintiff's goods. *Since the implied contract in such instances is purely a
4
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party would be estopped by the record to maintain a second suit;
so election of remedies would be mere surplusage there. When
thus limited and qualified, election of remedies is a neutral doc-
trine. It is harmless and practically useless; but it is hard to
justify any extension of the limitation. Modern ideas of justice
are not readily reconcilable to the proposition that a plaintiff must
lose a valuable right of action merely because his ignorant or care-
less attorney has attempted to pursue a remedy that was not avail-
able to him or has bungled what should have been a sufficient rem-
edy. So long as the plaintiff is acting in good faith, the law should
not place arbitrary and unwarranted restrictions upon his honest
efforts to get what is justly due him. If the defendant actually
owes something, there is small justification for allowing him to
escape payment through some artificial doctrine. On the other
hand, if he does not owe anything, he will usually not be preju-
diced by having the case tried on its merits.
As already indicated, it seems that West Virginia has not yet
saddled herself with this so-called doctrine of election of remedies.
Limited to its proper scope, it would not have changed the .result
in Cameron v. Cameron; for, in bringing the annulment suit, the
plaintiff was merely attempting to assert a remedy she did not
have. The case, however, afforded an excellent opportunity for
the court to take a definite stand as to the application and scope
of election of remedies in West Virginia, which was not exploited.
-GEORGE W. McQuAN.
BANKRUPTCY - TRUSTEES - ATTACK BY COURTS ON CREDIT
AssocIAONS. - The Report of the New York Bankruptcy In-
vestigation, usually referred to as the Donovan Report,' wrote an
important chapter into the story of bankruptcy administration in
the United States. Boldly formulated under the auspices of the
bench and bar to meet the serious challenges issuing from pre-
fictional device to enable the plaintiff to maintain assumpsit, it seems to be
going pretty far to say that he has affirmed and is bound by a contract which
every one knows never existed. If this idea of tentative affirmance were
adopted, it would seem that a plaintiff who has procured a judgment for
damages should not be barred from other remedies, unless his judgment has
been satisfied or is capable of being satisfied.
' Issued in March, 1930, by Col. William J. Donovan (formerly Assistant
to the Attorney General), acting as counsel for the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, the New York County Lawyers' Association, and
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